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This paper provides evidence that interbank markets are tiered rather than ﬂat, in the
sense that most banks do not lend to each other directly but through money center
banks acting as intermediaries. We capture the concept of tiering by developing a
core-periphery model, and devise a procedure for ﬁtting the model to real-world net-
works. Using Bundesbank data on bilateral interbank exposures among 1800 banks,
we ﬁnd strong evidence of tiering in the German banking system. Moreover, bank-
speciﬁc features, such as balance sheet size, predict how banks position themselves in
the interbank market. This link provides a promising avenue for understanding the
formation of ﬁnancial networks.
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G21, L14, D85, C63Non-technical summary
This paper deﬁnes interbank tiering and provides a network characterization founded
on intermediation. The interbank market is tiered when some banks intermediate
between banks that do not extend credit among themselves. We capture this market
structure by formulating a core-periphery model and devise a procedure for ﬁtting
the model to real-world networks. This can be thought of as running a regression,
but instead of estimating a parameter that achieves the best linear ﬁt, one determines
the optimal set of core banks that achieves the best structural match between the
observed network and a tiered structure of the same dimension. We show that our
procedure delivers a core which is a strict subset of intermediaries, excluding those
banks that play no essential role in holding together the interbank market. It also
yields a measure of distance that aggregates the structural inconsistencies between the
observed network and the nearest tiering model. We use this statistic to test formally
whether the extent of tiering observed in the interbank market is signiﬁcantly greater
than what emerges in networks formed by random processes.
Our empirical work relies on comprehensive Bundesbank statistics, which we use
to construct the network of bilateral interbank positions between more than 2000
banks. While most banks simultaneously borrow and lend in the interbank market,
we ﬁnd that the core comprises only 2.7% of such intermediaries. Tiering thus delivers
a strong reﬁnement of the concept of intermediation. Throughout the available time
span (1999Q1— 2007Q4), the size and composition of the optimal core remain stable.
This supports the view that we have identiﬁed a truly structural feature. Moreover,
we show that the extent of tiering observed in the German interbank market cannot
be replicated by standard random processes of network formation.
The ﬁnal part of the paper explores why the banking system organizes itself around
a core of money center banks by testing whether balance sheet variables predict which
kind of banks form the core. The probit regressions conﬁrm that (only) large banks
tend to belong to the core, even though economies of scale and scope play a limited
role. Other bank-speciﬁc variables, such as systemic importance, similarly predict
reliably the way a bank chooses to position itself in the interbank network. We also
show that the core of the banking system can be predicted by means of a regression
that uses only balance sheet variables, which is helpful since most countries do not
collect bilateral interbank data.
We show that the interbank market looks very dierent from what banking theoryimagines. The market is not a centralized exchange, but a sparse network, centered
around a tight set of core banks, which intermediate between numerous smaller banks
in the periphery. We also make novel use of network concepts that could be of broader
interest in the areas of ﬁnance and industrial organization. Our approach allows us to
measure how far a decentralized market is from a particular benchmark structure. To
make a structural quality of interest amenable to quantitative treatment, we formulate
a procedure — based on blockmodeling techniques — for ﬁtting a theoretical structure
to an observed network. Finally, the econometric part of the paper bridges two largely
distinct literatures on individual banks and on network formation. In line with the
view that dierent kinds of banks build systematically dierent patterns of linkages,
we ﬁnd that bank balance sheets reliably predict which banks position themselves in
the core and which remain in the periphery. This link could be of practical use for
central banks and regulators wishing to study their domestic interbank networks, for
it provides a structured alternative to the entropy method usually employed when no
bilateral data are available.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Studie wird die Schichtung des Interbankenmarkts („Tiering“)
deﬁniert und eine auf Intermediation gegründete Netzwerkcharakterisierung vorgenom-
men. Der Interbankenmarkt untergliedert sich in Ebenen, wenn einige Banken für
andere Banken, die einander keine Kredite gewähren, als Intermediär fungieren. Wir
bilden diese Marktstruktur ab, indem wir ein Kern-Peripherie-Modell formulieren und
ein Verfahren zur Anpassung des Modells an die Netzwerke der realen Welt entwick-
eln. Dies kann als Regressionsanalyse betrachtet werden, wobei anstatt der Schätzung
eines Parameters, der die beste lineare Anpassung gewährleistet, der optimale Kreis
von Kernbanken bestimmt wird, der die größte strukturelle Übereinstimmung zwis-
chen dem untersuchten Netzwerk und einer geschichteten Struktur derselben Dimen-
sion bietet. Wir zeigen, dass unser Verfahren einen Kern hervorbringt, der eine
strikte Teilgruppe von Intermediären darstellt und jene Banken ausnimmt, die für den
Zusammenhalt des Interbankenmarkts keine wesentliche Rolle spielen. Das Verfahren
führt außerdem zu einer Messgröße der Distanz, bei der die strukturellen Inkonsisten-
zen zwischen dem untersuchten Netzwerk und dem nächsten Tiering-Modell aggregiert
werden. Wir verwenden diese Statistik, um formal zu testen, ob der am Interbanken-
markt beobachtete Grad der Schichtung signiﬁkant höher ist als bei Netzwerken, die
auf der Grundlage von Zufallsverfahren gebildet wurden.
Unsere empirischen Untersuchungen beruhen auf umfassenden Statistiken der
Bundesbank, die wir zur Erstellung des Netzwerks bilateraler Interbankpositionen
unter mehr als 2 000 Banken einsetzen. Während die meisten Institute gleichzeitig
als Kreditgeber und Kreditnehmer am Interbankenmarkt agieren, umfasst der Kern
nach unseren Erkenntnissen lediglich 2,7 % solcher Intermediäre. Die Schichtung
ermöglicht somit eine deutliche Verfeinerung des Konzepts der Intermediation. Die
Größe und Zusammensetzung des optimalen Kerns bleiben über die gesamte verfüg-
bare Zeitspanne (1999Q1 — 2007Q4) stabil. Dies stützt die Annahme, dass wir ein
wirklich strukturelles Merkmal identiﬁziert haben. Wir weisen zudem nach, dass sich
der Gliederungsgrad des deutschen Interbankenmarkts nicht durch standardmäßige
Zufallsverfahren der Netzwerkbildung replizieren lässt.
Im abschließenden Teil der Studie wird untersucht, warum sich das Banken-
system um einen Kern sogenannter Money Center Banks, organisiert. Zu diesem
Zweck prüfen wir, ob sich anhand von Bilanzkennzahlen vorhersagen lässt, welche
Art von Banken den Kern bilden. Die Probit-Regressionen bestätigen, dass tenden-ziell (nur) Großbanken zum Kern gehören, wenngleich Skalen- und Verbundeekte
lediglich eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Auch anhand anderer bankspeziﬁscher
Variablen wie etwa der Systemrelevanz lässt sich zuverlässig vorausschätzen, wie sich
eine Bank im Interbankennetzwerk positionieren möchte. Ferner weisen wir nach,
dass der Kern des Bankensystems mittels einer Regression, bei der ausschließlich Bi-
lanzkennzahlen zugrunde gelegt werden, vorhergesagt werden kann. Dies ist insofern
hilfreich, als die meisten Länder keine bilateralen Interbankdaten erheben.
Wir zeigen, dass sich der Interbankenmarkt sehr stark von den Vorstellungen
der Banktheorie unterscheidet. Es handelt sich nicht um einen zentralisierten Markt,
sondern um ein weitmaschiges Netz mit einigen wenigen Kernbanken im Zentrum,
die als Intermediär zwischen zahlreichen kleineren, in der Peripherie angesiedelten
Banken fungieren. Wir bringen auch erstmals Netzwerkkonzepte zum Einsatz, die im
Bereich der Finanz- und Industrieorganisation von allgemeinem Interesse sein kön-
nten. Mit unserem Ansatz lässt sich messen, wie weit ein dezentraler Markt von
einer speziﬁschen Benchmark-Struktur entfernt ist. Um eine bestimmte strukturelle
Eigenschaft einer quantitativen Behandlung zugänglich zu machen, formulieren wir
auf Basis von Blockmodellmethoden ein Verfahren zur Anpassung einer theoretis-
chen Struktur an ein untersuchtes Netzwerk. Abschließend wird im ökonometrischen
Teil der Studie eine Brücke zwischen zwei weitgehend unterschiedlichen Zweigen der
Fachliteratur zu einzelnen Banken und zur Bildung von Netzwerken geschlagen. Im
Einklang mit der Auassung, dass verschiedene Arten von Banken systematisch un-
terschiedliche Verbindungsstrukturen aufbauen, stellen wir fest, dass sich anhand von
Bankbilanzen zuverlässig vorhersagen lässt, welche Banken sich im Kern positionieren
und welche in der Peripherie verbleiben. Dieser Zusammenhang könnte für Zentral-
banken und Regulierungsbehörden bei der Untersuchung ihrer inländischen Banken-
netzwerke von praktischem Nutzen sein, bildet er doch eine strukturierte Alternative
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This paper proposes the view that interbank markets are tiered, operating in a hier-
archical fashion where lower-tier banks deal with each other primarily through money
center banks. It may seem peculiar to focus on intermediation between banks; inter-
mediation is traditionally regarded as the activity that banks perform on behalf of
non-banks, such as depositors and ﬁrms (Gurley and Shaw (1956), Diamond (1984)).
The notion that banks themselves rely on another layer of intermediation goes largely
unnoticed in the formal banking literature. Yet such hierarchical structures appear
to be common in ﬁnancial markets well beyond banking.
The interbank market is often modeled in the literature as a centralized exchange
in which banks smooth liquidity shocks (e.g. Ho and Saunders (1985), Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987), or Freixas and Holthausen (2005)). In reality, the interbank market
is decentralized: deals are struck bilaterally between pairs of banks, not against a
central counterparty (Stigum and Crescenzi (2007)). This deﬁning feature of over-
the-counter markets is known to give rise to intermediaries (Du!e et al. (2005), Gale
and Kariv (2007)). While some recent models recognize the bilateral nature of the
interbank market (e.g. Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), and Leitner
(2005)), the presence of intermediaries, and hence the tiered character of this market,
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Bank of International Settlements, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, nor the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System. We thank the Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank
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for his input at an early stage of this project. We also thank Charles Calomiris, Fabio Castiglionesi,
Marco Galbiati, Jacob Gyntelberg, Carl-Christoph Hedrich, Sujit Kapadia, Sheri Markose, Perry
Mehrling, Steven Ongena, Nikola Tarashev, Kostas Tsatsaronis, and especially Heinz Herrmann
as well as our discussant Rod Garratt. Seminar participants at the Bank of England, Deutsche
Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Frankfurt School of Finance and Manage-
ment, and the Bank for International Settlements also provided helpful comments.Craig: Federal
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1has not been analyzed in any rigorous way. Yet the ﬁnancial crisis highlighted the need
to understand ﬁnancial market structure, and doing so is a prerequisite for regulatory
reform and macroprudential concepts addressing the "too-connected-to-fail" problem.
This paper deﬁnes interbank tiering and provides a network characterization
founded on intermediation. The interbank market is tiered when some banks in-
termediate between banks that do not extend credit among themselves. We capture
this market structure by formulating a core-periphery model and devise a procedure
for ﬁtting the model to real-world networks. This can be thought of as running a
regression, but instead of estimating a parameter that achieves the best linear ﬁt,
one determines the optimal set of core banks that achieves the best structural match
between the observed network and a tiered structure of the same dimension. We show
that our procedure delivers a core which is a strict subset of intermediaries, exclud-
ing those banks that play no essential role in holding together the interbank market.
It also yields a measure of distance that aggregates the structural inconsistencies
between the observed network and the nearest tiering model. We use this statistic
to test formally whether the extent of tiering observed in the interbank market is
signiﬁcantly greater than what emerges in networks formed by random processes.
Our empirical work relies on comprehensive Bundesbank statistics, which we use
to construct the network of bilateral interbank positions between more than 2000
banks. While most banks simultaneously borrow and lend in the interbank market,
we ﬁnd that the core comprises only 2.7% of such intermediaries. Tiering thus delivers
a strong reﬁnement of the concept of intermediation. Throughout the available time
span (1999Q1— 2007Q4), the size and composition of the optimal core remain stable.
This supports the view that we have identiﬁed a truly structural feature, one that
has hitherto only been described in qualitative terms using aggregate data (Ehrmann
and Worms (2004), Upper and Worms (2004)). Moreover, we show that the extent of
tiering observed in the German interbank market cannot be replicated by standard
random processes of network formation. The German interbank network ﬁts the core-
periphery model eight times better than Erdös-Rényi random graphs and about two
times better than scale-free networks of the same dimension and density.
If tiering is not the result of random processes but of purposeful behavior, there
must be economic reasons why the banking system organizes itself around a core
of money center banks. The ﬁnal part of the paper explores this idea by testing
whether balance sheet variables predict which kind of banks form the core. The probit
2regressions conﬁrm that (only) large banks tend to belong to the core, even though
economies of scale and scope play a limited role. Other bank-speciﬁc variables, such
as systemic importance, similarly predict reliably the way a bank chooses to position
itself in the interbank network. We also show that the core of the banking system can
be predicted by means of a regression that uses only balance sheet variables, which
is helpful since most countries do not collect bilateral interbank data.
Our work makes several contributions. First, we show that the interbank market
looks very dierent from what banking theory imagines. The market is not a cen-
tralized exchange, but a sparse network, centered around a tight set of core banks,
which intermediate between numerous smaller banks in the periphery. This raises
the question of why ﬁnancial intermediaries build yet another layer of intermedia-
tion between themselves. One possibility is the importance of intermediaries for the
transmission of information. This function of networks has recently been studied in
the social network literature (notably by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and
Galeotti and Goyal (2010) in this journal). A related issue is that persistence of the
hierarchical structure we ﬁnd could call into question the common assumption that
random liquidity shocks are a su!cient basis for explaining interbank activity.
Second, we make novel use of network concepts that could be of broader interest in
the areas of ﬁnance and industrial organization. Our approach allows us to measure
how far a decentralized market is from a particular benchmark structure. To make
a structural quality of interest amenable to quantitative treatment, we formulate a
procedure — based on blockmodeling techniques — for ﬁtting a theoretical structure
to an observed network. We solve this combinatorial problem by an optimization
algorithm and devise a new method of hypothesis testing to examine whether the
structural quality under study can be expected to arise randomly. The procedure
ﬁts any observed network and can be adapted to other theoretical market structures.
Our speciﬁc choice of a core-periphery structure is based on economic reasoning and
delivers a reﬁnement of intermediation. This constrasts with other network papers
that often report network measures unrelated to any concepts in banking and ﬁnance.
Finally, the econometric part of the paper bridges two largely distinct literatures
on individual banks and on network formation. In line with the view that dierent
kinds of banks build systematically dierent patterns of linkages, we ﬁnd that bank
balance sheets reliably predict which banks position themselves in the core and which
remain in the periphery. In other words, the observed network structure is the result
3of purposeful behavior, which is driven by factors that are reﬂected in bank balance
sheets. This link could be of practical use for central banks and regulators wishing
to study their domestic interbank networks, for it provides a structured alternative
to the entropy method usually employed when no bilateral data are available. More
generally, this link — between banking-speciﬁc features and network structure — is a
promising avenue for a better understanding of the formation of ﬁnancial networks.
This section provides a network characterization of the concept of interbank tiering. It
then develops a procedure for ﬁtting the model to real-world networks and implements
it through a fast algorithm. The concepts are illustrated by a simple example, and
the procedure and hypothesis tests are applied to the large German interbank market.
But ﬁrst we motivate and deﬁne interbank tiering.
Note that in deﬁning tiering in terms of interbank credit relations, we focus on
a meaningful economic choice. Interbank activity is based on relationships (Cocco
et al. (2009)). In order to lend, a bank typically has to run creditworthiness checks
(e.g. Broecker (1990)), the cost of which will limit the number of counterparties. As
such, a credit exposure is more likely to reﬂect an economic relationship than many
other transactions, such as the submission of a payment. The payments literature
uses the term tiering in related sense, to describe access to payment and settlement
systems (CPSS (2003), Kahn and Roberds (2009)): in some systems, only few banks
are direct members, and other banks have to transact through members to settle
payments with each other (e.g. CHAPS in the United Kingdom).2 However, the
routing of payments (on behalf of customers) diers from the extension of credit
between banks. Exposures, unlike payments, do not cease to exist after they have
been made, so the structure of the resulting network is of greater relevance for ﬁnancial
stability.
Banks may rely on intermediaries for a variety of functions. One is liquidity distribu-
tion, the process of channeling funds from surplus banks to deﬁcit banks (e.g. Niehans
2This literature focuses on the determinants of membership (Kahn and Roberds (2009) and
Galbiati and Giansante (2009)). In practice, this involves legal and technological factors as much as
economic considerations.
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2 Tiering in the interbank market
2.1 From intermediation to tieringand Hewson (1976), Bruche and Suarez (2010)). Another is risk management: banks
may place interbank deposits for purposes of diversiﬁcation, risk-sharing, and insur-
ance (e.g. Allen and Gale (2000), Leitner (2005)). Banks may also take and place
funds in dierent maturities to alter their maturity proﬁle (e.g. Diamond (1991),
Hellwig (1994)). For these and other functions (including custodian or settlement
services), banks rely on intermediaries in ways that give rise to interbank credit ex-
posures.
Deﬁnition 1: Interbank intermediation. An interbank intermediary is a bank
acting both as lender and borrower in the interbank market.
This is the standard concept of ﬁnancial intermediation, applied more narrowly
to the banking market. The set of interbank intermediaries can be identiﬁed from
existing banking data as the subset of banks recording both claims and liabilities vis-
à-vis other banks on their balance sheet. Our concept of interbank tiering describes
the interbank structure that arises when some banks intermediate between banks
that do not extend credit among themselves.
5Deﬁnition 2: Interbank tiering. Some banks (the top tier) lend to each other
and intermediate between other banks, which participate in the interbank market only
via these top-tier banks.
An interbank market is tiered when it is organized in layers, which we call tiers
to evoke the hierarchical nature of the concept — in contrast with a "ﬂat" structure
without intermediaries. This can be expressed in terms of bilateral relations between




1. Top-tier banks lend to each other,
2. lower-tier banks do not lend to each other,
3. top-tier banks lend to (some) lower-tier banks, and
4. top-tier banks borrow from (some) lower-tier banks.
(1)
This formulation conveys several important points. Tiering is a structural property
of the system, not a property of any individual bank. Furthermore, tiering is a
network concept: the banks in the system are partitioned into two sets based on their
bilateral relations with each other. At the same time, unlike other network concepts,
tiering is founded on an economic concept that is central to banking and ﬁnance,
intermediation. In fact, tiering is a reﬁnement of intermediation: top-tier banks
are special intermediaries that play a central role in holding together the interbank
market.
Before developing a formal characterization, we provide a simple illustration of
interbank tiering.
Example. Consider the left panel of Figure 1 (the other panels will be discussed
later). Banks {G>I>K} are either lenders or borrowers, not both. The set of
intermediaries thus consists of the remaining banks {D>E>F>H>J}.B a n kF,f o r
instance, intermediates from lender I to borrower K. It takes a chain of banks
(involving D and F) to intermediate from G to K. The top tier consists of a
strict subset of intermediaries, namely {D>E>F} s h o w ni ns o l i dc o l o r ,w h i l et h e
remaining banks constitute the lower tier. For this partition of banks, the relations
within and between the two sets exactly match the relations listed in (1). Banks
H and J are intermediaries, but they belong to the lower tier because they are
not su!ciently connected with other banks to qualify for the top tier (where they
would violate the relations 1, 3 and 4). This reﬂects the fact that these two banks
play no role in connecting lower-tier banks to the interbank market.
6Model  Diagonal-block errors  Off-diagonal-block errors 
The left panel illustrates a perfectly tiered interbank structure in a stylized interbank market 
comprising 8 banks. The arrows represent the direction of credit exposure, e.g. bank D lends to A. 
The middle and right panels depict examples of networks that are not perfectly tiered. 
Figure 1: Stylized example of an interbank market
This example illustrates a perfectly tiered interbank structure. In reality, the
presence of tiering will be a matter of degree. Much of what follows serves to develop
methods that formalize how to think about the distance between real-world networks
and perfectly tiered structures.
This section develops a structural representation for our deﬁnition of interbank tier-
ing. This will serve as a benchmark model against which empirical interbank market
structures can be assessed. A network consists of a set of nodes that are connected by
links. Taking each bank as a node, the interbank positions between them constitute
the network, which can be represented as a square matrix of dimension q equal to
the number of banks in the system. The typical element (l>m) of this matrix rep-
resents a gross interbank claim, the value of credit extended by bank l to bank m.
Row l thus shows bank l’s bilateral interbank claims, and column l shows the same
bank’s interbank liabilities to each of the banks in the system. The diagonal elements
(l>l) are zero when treating banks as consolidated entities (with intragroup exposures
netted out). O-diagonal elements are positive, or zero in the absence of a bilateral
7
2.2 Network characterization of tieringposition. Real-world interbank data typically give rise to directed, sparse and valued
networks.3 Since the concept of tiering is about the bilateral structure of linkages, we
code the presence or absence of a link by 1 or 0, as is common practice in network
analysis. Thus, non-symmetric binary matrices will be used to represent the model
and the empirical interbank network in our application.
We characterize a perfectly tiered structure in the shape of a network. The bilat-
eral relations (1) consistent with our deﬁnition of tiering are mapped into a matrix,
P, with top-tier banks ordered ﬁrst. For reasons that will become clear shortly, we
shall call the set of top-tier banks "the core" (F), and the set of lower-tier banks "the
periphery" (S). The nodes within each tier are equivalent with respect to the nature
of their linkages with other nodes. Hence it su!ces to specify the generic relations







The block denoted by FF ("core to core") speciﬁes how top-tier banks relate to other
core banks: when they all lend to each other, as speciﬁed in (1), FF is a block of
ones (ignoring the zero diagonal). Likewise, periphery banks not lending to each
other makes SS a square matrix of zeros. Core banks lending to some banks in
the periphery means that FS must be "row regular", meaning that it contains at
least one link in every row. Similarly, when all core banks borrow from at least one
periphery bank, SFis a "column regular" matrix with at least one 1 in every column.
Our deﬁnition of tiering therefore translates into the choice and location of speciﬁc
block types. (Other theories would require dierent block types, but our procedure for
estimating the implied market structure would still apply.) The blockmodel of tiering
consists of a complete block (denoted 1) and a zero block (0) on the diagonal, which
speciﬁes relations within the tiers, and two o-diagonal blocks specifying relations
3The networks are directed, because a claim of bank l on m (an asset of l) is not the same as
a claim of m on l (a liability of l). They are sparse as only a small share of the q(q  1) potential
bilateral links are used at any point in time. Finally, interbank networks are valued because interbank
positions are reported in monetary values, as opposed to 1 or 0 indicating the presence or absence
of a claim.
4Blockmodels are theoretical reductions of networks and have a long tradition in the analysis of
social roles (Wasserman and Faust (1994)).







This model speciﬁes the market structure only — the overall size of P and its blocks
will be determined once we set the number and identity of banks allocated to each
tier. If f banks end up in the core, then the block FS, for instance, will be a matrix
of dimension f×(qf). One easily veriﬁes that our simple example of tiering (Figure
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Our network characterization of tiering is a reﬁnement of the general core-periphery
model in sociology. In social network analysis, this label is attached to any network
with a dense cohesive core and a sparse periphery (Borgatti and Everett (1999)), as
reﬂected in the diagonal blocks 1 and 0 in (2). However, the core-periphery model in
this literature does not specify how the core and periphery are related to each other;
t h eb l o c k so nt h eo -diagonal could be of any type and are often ignored in the analy-
sis (as recommended by Borgatti and Everett (1999)). In building on intermediation,
our model of tiering does specify how the core and periphery should be related: core
banks borrow from, and lend to, at least one bank in the periphery; they intermedi-
ate between banks in the periphery and thereby hold together the entire interbank
market.
This particular focus on how the core and periphery are related is based on an
economic rationale that seems appropriate for the interbank market. Core banks are
in the market at all times and incur interbank positions with important counterparties
in the normal course of business (hence FF = 1). Periphery banks, on the other hand,
might only lend, or borrow, or might not participate in the interbank market at all
5These terms come from the literature on generalized blockmodeling (Doreian et al. (2005)). A
column-regular block, CR, has each column (but not necessarily each row) covered by at least one
1;t h eRR block has each row covered by at least one 1.
9when they have no deﬁcits or risks to cover at that moment. It would be too restrictive
to require that every bank in the periphery has to be connected;6 but the periphery
as a whole should certainly be linked to the core, or else there would not be a single
cohesive interbank market.7 T h ec h o i c eo fr o w -a n dc o l u m n - r e g u l a rb l o c k so nt h e
o-diagonal of P ﬁnds the right balance by placing strong restrictions only on core
banks: every core bank must be connected to at least one bank in the periphery, but
t h ec o n v e r s en e e dn o th o l d .
We now focus on how to determine the extent to which an observed real-world network
exhibits tiering. How does one test for the entire structure in a network? Visual
inspection is instructive but inconclusive for large networks, and traditional network
statistics do not relate to any underlying model, tiered or otherwise. Our approach is
to compare the network of interest with the model in terms of a measure of distance
that aggregates the structural inconsistencies between them. If the observed network
and the best-ﬁtting tiering model remain at great distance from each other, then the
network does not have a tiered structure.
We formulate a procedure for ﬁtting the model P to an observed network Q.T h i s
can be thought of as running a regression, but instead of estimating the parameter
 that achieves the best linear ﬁt, one determines the optimal set of core banks that
achieves the best structural match between Q and P, a perfectly tiered structure.
We show that the solution has the desirable property that the core is a strict subset
of all intermediaries. Finding this solution is a large-scale problem in combinatorial
optimization for which we develop a fast algorithm. We then evaluate the degree of
tiering in the observed network by testing the goodness of ﬁt against the distribution
obtained from ﬁtting random networks for which tiering is not expected to emerge.
The tiering model P serves as the benchmark for assessing the extent of tiering
inherent in an observed interbank network Q. These two objects have to be made
6This would be the result of deﬁning FS and SF as complete (1) or regular blocks. A regular
block has at least one 1 in every row and column, implying that every periphery bank lends to, and
borrows from, some bank in the core (which would make all banks in the system intermediaries).
7This degenerate case of an unconnected periphery is permitted in the weak core-periphery model
(with FS and SF zero blocks) discussed by Borgatti and Everett (1999)).
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2.3 Testing for structure
2.3.1 Fitting the model to a networkcomparable. The observed network Q is a square matrix of dimension q equal to
the number of banks, with Qlm =1if bank l lends to bank m 6= l,a n dQlm =0
otherwise. The model P, on the other hand, is a generic structure that embodies
the relations in (1) for any dimension. The ﬁtting procedure involves two steps:
ﬁrst, we deﬁne a measure of distance between the network and the model P of the
same dimension, using (2) as the matching criterion; then, we solve for the optimal
(distance-minimizing) partition of banks into core and periphery. Working with the
optimal ﬁt takes care of the problem that tiering is a qualitative concept that does
not depend on the exact size of the core (or periphery) as long as there are two tiers.
The measure of distance we adopt, following the generalized blockmodeling ap-
proach of Doreian et al. (2005), is a total error score. It aggregates the number of
inconsistencies between the observed network and the chosen model. Consider an
arbitrary partition where f banks are considered for the core, leaving (q  f) banks
in the periphery. Denote the set of core banks by F; ordering core banks ﬁrst (and
rearranging Q by permutation accordingly) makes F = {1>2>===>f}= This partition
divides the observed matrix Q into four blocks, and the model P predicts how each
block should look in a perfectly tiered network of the same dimension. In particular,
the top tier FF should be a complete block 1 of size f2, so any missing link (outside
the diagonal) presents an inconsistency with the model (2), as one core bank has no
exposure to another. Likewise, any observed link within the periphery (SS) consti-
tutes an error relative to P, as periphery banks should not transact directly with each
other in a perfectly tiered market. Errors in the o-diagonal blocks penalize zero rows
(columns), because these are inconsistent with row-regularity (column-regularity, re-
spectively): a zero row in FS indicates that a core bank fails to lend to any of the
(q  f) banks in the periphery, violating a deﬁning feature of core banks. Similarly,
az e r oc o l u m ni nSF shows that the corresponding core bank does not borrow at
all from the periphery, producing as many errors as there are banks in the periphery






























The total error score aggregates the errors across the four blocks.8 We normalize the
8The aggregation of errors can be adapted to cases in which one type of error is more consequential
11error score by the total number of links in the observed network,
h =






The total error score is our measure of distance; it is a function since every possible
partition into two tiers is associated with a particular value of h. Denote this function
by h(F),w h e r eF stands for the set of banks under consideration for the core. The
optimal core, FW, is the set(s) of banks that produces the smallest distance to the
model P of the same dimension,
F
W =a r g m i n h(F)
= {F 5 K | h(F)  h(f) ;f 5 K}> (5)
where K denotes all strict and non-empty subsets of the population {1>2>===>q}.I n t u -
itively, the expression (5) determines the number and identity of banks in Q that are
core banks in the sense of the interbank tiering model. The following example illus-
trates in a simple way how structural inconsistencies between Q and P are measured
by the distance function and minimized by the optimal core.
Example. Consider Figure 1, where the left panel shows our earlier example of a
tiered structure (P). The other panels depict examples of networks that are not
perfectly tiered (Q). In the middle panel, suppose we knew that banks {D>E>F}
are good candidates for the core. If so, however, we observe that one core bank
(E) does not lend to another core bank F, and periphery bank G lends directly to
another (K). Accordingly, the matrix (3) yields one error in each of the diagonal
blocks FF and SS. As no other partition attains a lower error score, {D>E>F}
remains the optimal core, as it minimizes the total error score to h(FW)=2 @13.
Suppose we conjecture that {D>E>F} also forms the core of the network in the
right panel. We observe that one putative core bank does not lend to the periphery
at all; this immediately generates 5 ﬁtting errors in block FS for F’s failure to lend
to any of the 5 banks in the periphery. Moving F to the periphery instead causes
a single error (its continued link with periphery bank I), in addition to the existing
error (G lending to K) . T h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h en e t w o r ka n dt h em o d e lc a n
than another. E.g. multiplying (H12 + H21) by a parameter below unity deemphasizes the relation
between core and periphery; multiplying H11 by a number above unity will yield a solution with a
smaller, tightly connected core. As no theoretical priors on intermediation suggest otherwise, we use
the equally weighted aggregation of errors, in line with the overall dimension of the network.
12thus be reduced by placing bank F in the periphery, i.e. by considering a tiering
model with only two nodes in the core (and six in the periphery). The optimal ﬁt
yields two errors in the (enlarged) periphery, none in the (reduced) core {D>E},
and none again in the o-diagonal blocks, for a total score of h(FW)=2 @12.T h e
new core excludes bank F, which obviously remains an intermediary, illustrating
that the core comprises only those intermediaries that intermediate between banks
in the periphery, as required by Deﬁnition 2.
Real-world network are far more complex than this example suggests, with struc-
tures that may be arbitrarily far removed from that of a tiered market. This makes
it essential to understand the properties of the optimal ﬁt and to develop an e!cient
procedure for arriving at this solution. We now show that the solution preserves the
main features illustrated in this simple example.
The procedure of minimizing the distance between model P and network Q delivers
the optimal partition of banks into core and periphery. Based on our deﬁnition of
distance (3)-(4), the solution has the following properties:
Proposition 1:
(a) The presence of intermediaries is necessary and su!cient for a core-periphery
structure: (i) A network without intermediaries has no core.
(ii) A network with intermediaries has a core (and a periphery under one weak
condition).
(b) The core is a (strict) subset of the set of intermediaries:
(i) All core banks are intermediaries, but
(ii) Intermediaries are not part of the core if they do not lend to, or do not
borrow from, the periphery.
Proof: see Appendix A. The ﬁrst property relates to existence and shows that the
distance-minimizing procedure can identify a core-periphery structure in virtually all
networks. The su!cient condition for a core is the presence of at least one inter-
mediary. A periphery always exists under the weak (and su!cient) condition that
the network contains either unattached banks, or one missing bilateral link. This is
intuitive, since an interbank market in which every bank lends to all other banks, as
13
2.3.2 Properties of the solutionin Allen and Gale (2000), cannot be regarded as tiered but must be viewed as "ﬂat",
since banks are all equal in their connection patterns. The core-periphery model can
be ﬁtted under conditions that are satisﬁed by all realistic interbank networks.
The second property shows that our concept of tiering delivers a useful reﬁnement
on the concept of intermediation: the core is a strict subset of all intermediaries.
Core banks are special intermediaries that connect banks in the periphery. While
this property is, of course, in line with our deﬁnition of tiering (and thus embodied in
P), the result states that this property carries over one-for-one to the solution when
ﬁtting P to an observed network Q. This is remarkable, because one would expect
any statistical ﬁtting procedure on a large network to produce some errors in every
block of (3). However, the o-diagonal blocks governing the relations between core
and periphery have error scores of exactly zero. Consequently, the error score (4) at
the optimum takes the simple form
h(F
W)=





We have encountered these properties of the solution in the example above, where
o-diagonal errors were zero and the optimal core {D>E} was a strict subset of all in-
termediaries {D>E>F>H>J}. The traditional core-periphery model, which disregards
o-diagonal blocks (Borgatti and Everett (1999)), would have retained bank F in the
core (in Figure 1, right panel), even though F no longer intermediates between banks
in the periphery.
Fitting the model to a real-world network is a large-scale problem in combinatorial
optimization. Only for very small networks can the solution be found by exhaus-
tive search. In our example with 8 banks, for instance, computing the total error
scores for each of the 28 =2 5 6possible partitions conﬁrms that {D>E} is indeed
the (unique) solution that minimizes the error function. This brute-force approach
becomes infeasible for larger networks. A medium-sized banking system of some 250
banks already requires on the order of 1078 possible subsets (2q)t ob ee v a l u a t e df o r
determining the optimal core. The problem of ﬁnding an optimal subset — which our
paper shares with Kirman et al. (2007) and Ballester et al. (2010) — is NP-hard.
The computational complexity of such problems rises exponentially with q,s ot h a t
they cannot be solved by exhaustive search. The goal of ﬁtting the model to realistic
14
2.3.3 Implementationnetworks, such as the German interbank market with close to 2000 active banks, calls
for a more pragmatic procedure.
Our implementation thus relies on a sequential optimization algorithm, which fol-
lows closely the switching logic employed in our proof of Proposition 1. An initial
random partition is evaluated and improved upon by moving banks between the core
and periphery until the total error score (4) can no longer be reduced. The greedy ver-
sion of our algorithm follows the steepest descent, switching from one tier to another
the bank that contributes most to the error score at each iteration. To avoid running
into local optima, a second version employs simulated annealing, which allows for a
degree of randomness when moving banks, which declines monotonically as the opti-
mum is being approached. One way to test whether the procedure returns a global
optimum is by inspecting the associated H, since we know from Proposition 1 that
a genuine solution necessarily comes with a diagonal error matrix. Appendix B de-
scribes the robustness checks we performed to ascertain that the procedure converges
to a global optimum. The main programming challenge consisted of reducing the
algorithm’s polynomial running time from order q3 to q1. This made the algorithm
su!ciently fast for the repeated applications necessary for hypothesis testing.
Having shown how to ﬁt the model, we address the issue of signiﬁcance: how can
one evaluate the extent to which the observed network exhibits tiering? The closer
the network resembles a tiered structure, the lower will be the error score (6). For a
formal test, one must compare the distance between the network and the model to
some benchmark. Selecting a benchmark, however, is not straightforward since we
are assessing a qualitative feature relating to market structure. Moreover, it would
be questionable — as in econometrics — to change, without a theoretical basis, the
underlying model only to improve the statistical ﬁt. It is easy to reduce the total
error score by choice of a weaker model, for instance by replacing the complete block 1
in (2) by a (more accommodative) regular block.9 S u c ha na dh o cc h a n g ei nt h e
structure would undermine the theoretical arguments advanced in Section 1.2, which
led to this particular model. We therefore adopt a dierent strategy for evaluating
9Model selection remains an underexplored area in blockmodeling. Doreian et al. (2005) provide
no clear guidance, although they rightly caution against selecting among block types to minimize
the number of structural inconsistencies.
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2.3.4 Hypothesis test against random networkssigniﬁcance.10
In a ﬁrst step, we assess whether a tiering model is worth ﬁtting at all. Recall that
our measure of distance (4)-(6) normalizes the aggregate error by the total number
of links in the observed network, PPQlm. This is also the maximum error under the
alternative hypothesis that the network comprises only a periphery. The minimum
distance h(FW) can therefore be used in a basic test, similar in spirit to an F-test
of joint signiﬁcance which tests whether it is worth including regressors at all.11 If
h(FW)  1, then there is no value in ﬁtting a tiering model: doing so generates more
structural inconsistencies than does a "ﬂat" model with a periphery alone. In that
case there is no evidence of a core standing out as a separate tier.12 We require that
h(FW) attain a value well below unity to proceed.
In the second step, our strategy is to vary the data rather than the model: we
test the total error score against the Monte Carlo distribution function from a data-
generating process in which tiering is not expected to emerge. In particular, the error
h(FW) associated with the observed network Q is tested against the error distribution
obtained by ﬁtting simulated networks where links are formed by exogenous statistical
processes. The standard classes are random graphs introduced by Erdös and Rényi
and scale-free networks popularized by Albert and Barabási and widely observed in
the natural sciences (Newman et al. (2006)):
• A random graph is obtained by connecting any two nodes with a ﬁxed and inde-
pendent probability s. Any realization of such a network also has an expected
density of s. A node can be expected to have a degree,o rn u m b e ro fl i n k s ,o f
s(q  1) on each side in the case of a directed network. The expected degree
distribution around this characteristic value is Binomial, converging to Poisson
for large q.
10Our approach of comparing a network to a speciﬁc model contrasts with the maximum likelihood
method developed by Copic et al. (2009), which ﬁnds the partition with the highest probability of
producing the observed network. (Wetherilt et al. (2009) apply this method to the 13 banks observed
in the UK large-value payment system CHAPS.) In contrast to our approach of ﬁtting an underlying
model, their method speciﬁes the likeliest community structure, deﬁned as groups of nodes more
likely to connect within than across groups. However, community structure diers from our core-
periphery notion: periphery banks are in the lower tier precisely because they are unlikely to connect
to each other.
11This test requires no distribution, since the observed network comprises the full population (not
only a sample) of nodes.
12The other side of the test (a "ﬂat" model with only a core) can be disregarded, except in the
unusual case where the density of the observed network exceeds 50%.
16• A scale-free network, on the other hand, has no characteristic scale: nodes
with a lower degree are proportionately more likely than nodes with n times
that degree, for any n. The degree distribution thus follows a power law. One
statistical process giving rise to scale-free networks is known as preferential
attachment, whereby new nodes attach to existing nodes with a probability
proportional to the latters’ degrees. This formation process tends to produce a
few highly connected hubs, suggesting that scale-free networks match interbank
networks more closely than do random graphs.
Random and scale-free models are not hierarchical in nature (Ravasz and Barabási
(2003)). The purely statistical nature of these network formation processes is at odds
with the idea that banks, by purposeful economic choice, organize themselves around
a core of intermediaries, giving rise to interbank tiering. We therefore generate 1000
random networks of the same dimension and density as the observed network Q,
and ﬁt the model P to every realization. This allows us to trace out an empirical
distribution function Ih for the error score in an environment where tiering occurs only
by chance. We say that Q exhibits a signiﬁcant degree of tiering if the associated
test statistic h(FW) is closer to zero than the bottom percentile of the distribution
function found for random networks,
Reject H0 if: h(F
W) ?I h(0=01)=
This signiﬁcance test can be conducted separately for each class of random networks,
Erdös-Rényi and scale-free. It can also be understood as rejecting the hypothesis that
networks formed by standard random processes would produce the extent of tiering
observed in Q. As tiering is not expected to arise in such networks, it must be the
result of incentives of banks for linking to each other in this particular way. Following
our application, we explore this direction in the ﬁnal section.
We employ a set of comprehensive banking statistics known as the “Gross- und Mil-
lionenkreditstatistik” (statistics on large loans and concentrated exposures). The data
are compiled by the Evidenzzentrale der Deutschen Bundesbank. According to the
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3 Application to the German banking system
3.1 Constructing the interbank networkBanking Act of 1998, ﬁnancial institutions located in Germany must report on a
quarterly basis each counterparty to whom they have extended credit in the amount
of at least 1.5 million or 10% of their liable capital. If either threshold is exceeded
at any time during the quarter, the lender reports outstanding claims (of any matu-
rity) as they stand at the end of the quarter. From these reports, the Bundesbank
assembles the central credit register, which is employed by reporting institutions for
monitoring borrower indebtedness and by the authorities for monitoring individual
exposures and the overall ﬁnancial system.
The nature of these data presents several advantages. Claims are reported with
a full counterparty breakdown vis-à-vis thousands of banks and ﬁrms. The bilateral
positions are therefore directly observed and need not be estimated as in many other
studies.13 This makes it legitimate to apply network methods. Second, positions are
quoted in monetary values (in millions of euros), indicating both the presence and
strength of bilateral links. As the concept of tiering is about the structure of linkages,
however, the monetary values are used here only to indicate the presence of a credit
exposure. Third, the data are available on a quarterly basis since 1999Q1, which
allows us to observe the structure of the network over time.
We gathered all reported bilateral positions between banks to construct the in-
terbank network. To capture relations between legal entities (rather than internal
markets), we consolidated banks by ownership at the level of the Konzern (bank
holding company), thereby purging intragroup positions. We also excluded cross-
border linkages in order obtain a self-contained network (since further linkages of
counterparties abroad remain unobserved). The resulting network is represented as a
square matrix Q with 4.76 million cells containing the bilateral interbank exposures
among 2182 banks (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) located in Germany.
Some basic statistics convey a ﬁrst impression. The German banking system is
one of the largest in the world, with assets totaling 7.6 trillion ($11 trillion) at the
end of 2007. Reﬂecting the key role of the interbank market, consolidated domestic
interbank positions sum to 1.056 trillion, making up a sizeable share of banks’
balance sheets. Even after Konzern-level consolidation, the number of active banks
13Bilateral interbank positions often have to be either reconstructed from payment ﬂows (e.g.
Furﬁne (2003), Bech and Atalay (2010), and Wetherilt et al. (2009)), or estimated from balance
sheet data using entropy methods (Upper and Worms (2004), Boss et al. (2004)). Mistrulli (2007)
documents the resulting bias when estimating contagion (see Degryse et al. (2009) for a survey).
More importantly for our purposes, the entropy method spreads linkages so evenly that essential
qualitative features of the network structure would disappear.
18in the interbank market varies between 1760 to 1802 for our sample period. This
set comprises, on average, 40 private credit banks (Kreditbanken), 400 savings banks
(Sparkassen), 1150 credit unions (Kreditgenossenschaften), and 200 special purpose
banks. Yet the network is sparse, with a density on the order of 0.41% of possible
links (0.61% when excluding banks with no interbank borrowing or lending).14 This
sparsity suggests the presence of a discernible structure. The German banking system
thus represents a network of interest not only in its own right, but also aords an
opportunity to test whether a network of this size can be characterized with a simple
core-periphery structure.
We now ﬁt the tiered structure P to the German interbank network. The ﬁrst
results focus on a representative mid-sample quarter, 2003 Q2, in which 1802 banks
(out of 2182) participated in the interbank market, 1671 as intermediaries, 67 as
lenders only, and 64 as borrowers only. The fact that a large share (76.6%) of banks
both lend and borrow is not unique to the German interbank market (e.g. 66% of
banks in the Portuguese interbank market do so, see Cocco et al. (2009)). Using
the procedure developed above, the optimal core was found to include 45 banks.15
This is indeed a strict subset, comprising only 2.7% of intermediaries. As expected
from Proposition 1, the core includes only those intermediaries that borrow from,
and lend to, the periphery (the lower tier). The core excludes all those banks that
appear as intermediaries in the data but play no essential role in the market. Many
banks simply transform their maturity proﬁle by taking and placing funds in dierent
maturities, often with a single counterparty in the core (see also Ehrmann and Worms
(2004)).
This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the core is a strong reﬁnement of the concept of inter-
mediation. The core here is much smaller than what is sometimes called the core in
other network studies.16 By building on intermediation, our model of tiering leads to
14Further network measures for the German interbank market are reported in Craig, Fecht, and
von Borstel (2010).
15The optimal ﬁt was robust across algorithms, as described in Appendix B.
16For Broder et al. (2000), the core of the worldwide web is the giant strongly connected component
(GSCC), the set of pages that can reach one another through hyperlinks in both directions. Pages
that can reach (or can be reached by) the core make up the giant in-component (or out-component,
respectively). Broder et al. (2000) and subsequent studies thus use the core-periphery notion in a
weaker sense of "reachability", regardless of how many links (and thus intermediaries) it takes for
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3.2 Fitting the core-periphery modela tighter core, comprising only 2% of banks in the network (see Figure 2). Yet the
interbank market would not be a single market without this core. The exact size of
the core, however, is less important than its existence in the ﬁrst place; the core would
contain fewer banks, for instance, if one attached a higher penalty on errors within
the FF block than on those in other blocks.The total error score (4) of the optimal ﬁt
Figure 2: Tiering as a reﬁnement of intermediation
came to 12.2% of network links. This is an average of 1.3 errors per bank, compared
to an average of 11 links per active bank. Normalizing instead by the dimension of
the network (= q(q  1)) shows that only 0.074% of all cells prove inconsistent with
the model P. The total number of errors reached its minimum at 2406, comprising
683 errors (missing interbank links) within the core. The density of the core is still
66%, more than 100 times greater than the overall density of the network. The error
matrix (3) inevitably features no errors in the o-diagonal blocks, consistent with
the theoretical properties derived in Proposition 1. The majority of errors (1723)
therefore occur because there are direct transactions taking place among banks in the
one page to reach another. As a result, their core is a large subset (28%) of all pages in the sample.
Applied to the Fedwire payment network, Soramäki et al. (2007) ﬁnd the GSCC to comprise nearly
80% of banks in the network.













































































































































The figure shows the size of the estimated core (number of banks, left axis) and the 
total error score (expressed as a percentage of links as in equation (4), right axis) for 
the German interbank network on a quarterly basis. 
Figure 3: Structural stability over time
through 2007Q4. The structure we identiﬁed is highly persistent. First, the size of the
core and the associated error score are stable over time (see Figure 3). The exception
is the apparent break in series in 2006Q3, where a number of mergers reduced the
size from 44-46 banks prior to this date, to 35-37 banks thereafter.17 Importantly,
the composition of banks within the core also remains remarkably stable over time.







Core 0=940 0=049 0=011





17A number of mergers among banks in the core occurred, so the new core became a subset of the
old core including the consolidated banks.
21The element SCore-Periphery represents the frequency with which core banks move to
the periphery over time. The third state (outside the sample) takes care of exits from
the banking population. The fact that the values on the diagonal are close to unity
conﬁrms that banks tend to remain in the same tier (core or periphery). Estimating
a separate transition matrix for each quarter demonstrates its stability over time
(Figure 4).18
These ﬁndings support the idea that we have identiﬁed a truly structural feature
of the interbank market. The persistence of this tiered structure poses a challenge to
interbank theories that build on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). If unexpected liquidity
shocks were the basis for interbank activity, should the observed linkages not be
as random as the shocks? Should the observed network not change unpredictably
every period? If this were the case, it would make little sense for central banks and
regulatory authorities to run interbank simulations gauging future contagion risks.
The stability of the observed interbank structure suggests otherwise.
Before evaluating the statistical signiﬁcance of tiering, it is important to address po-
tential caveats. One concern relates to the way the banking statistics are collected:
could the reporting threshold (1.5 million or 10% of liable capital) bias the results?
To test this possibility, we performed a censoring test whereby the model was ﬁtted to
networks deﬁned by successively higher thresholds (from 1.5 to 100 millions, where
only 50% of the value of reported positions remained in the network). The tiered
structure remained unaected, and the error score declined with each iteration. Ap-
parently, much of the direct lending within the periphery is in smaller denominations,
which dropped out as the censoring threshold increased. Indeed, the value of lending
within the periphery accounts for less than 2% of total interbank credit. Applying this
logic in reverse suggests that one would still observe a tiered structure if the reporting
threshold were zero, although with more direct lending within in the periphery.
A more important question is whether legal structure and public ownership de-
termine the network properties of the German banking system. The public savings
banks have a special relationship with their respective Landesbanken, which provide
them with borrowing and lending services (Schlierbach and Püttner (2003)). In a




for the single quarter 2006Q3 (see Figure 4).
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3.2.1 RobustnessFigure 4: Transition Probabilities over Time
23less prescriptive way, credit union banks also have a special relationship with their
central cooperative banks. These pillars, and the tiering within them, are widely
noted features of the German banking system. They are discussed in the interbank
context by Ehrmann and Worms (2004) and Upper and Worms (2004). However,
the observed network is not simply an institutional artifact but is rooted in economic
choices. With few exceptions, banks are free to lend and borrow from other banks
throughout the entire system — the data indeed show many direct linkages between
periphery banks across dierent pillars. Moreover, the tiered network structure we
identiﬁed predates subsequent legal developments: Guinnane (2002) describes how
the regional head institutions arose to provide much-needed intermediation and pay-
ment services to the regionally dispersed credit unions and savings banks in the 19th
century, well before the legal developments of the postwar period.
The view that economic motives, not only institutional factors, give rise to a core-
periphery structure can also be examined by removing various segments, or their
respective head institutions, from the network (Figure 5). First, the two most con-
nected banks (head institutions) were removed from the network along with all of their
links. These two banks together maintain so many links that their number exceeds
the total links of the next ﬁfteen banks and so could greatly aect the error score. The
estimated core of the reduced network reveals a time series of cores with essentially
the same properties and banks as the original network. Other conﬁgurations of bank
deletions yielded similar results.
The most drastic experiment was the entire removal of the two pillars most likely
to be shaped by legal factors, the savings banks and credit cooperatives. This was to
test whether tiering would occur in the remaining — and least regulated — segment of
the German banking system. Once again, the presence of a core remains a consistent
feature, varying quite smoothly between 22 and 27 during the 36 quarters (Figure
5, solid lines). This is in spite of considerable merger activity in this segment of the
banking industry over the sample period.19 A more general concern could be that
our model is not su!ciently sophisticated to capture the structure of the German
(or any other) banking system. Our preference for the simple core-periphery model
P is that it builds on intermediation. However, the ﬁtting procedure we develop
can also serve for estimating alternative market structures deﬁned by other block
19Interestingly, the structural break in 2006Q3 for the entire bank population is now absent; this















































































































































The figure shows the number of banks in the estimated core (in blue, left axis) and the 
total error score (in red, right axis) over time for two different experiments. In the 
first, shown with dashed lines, the two most connected banks (head institutions) are 
removed from the network. In the second experiment, shown with solid lines, all saving 
banks and credit cooperatives (pillars) are removed.  
Figure 5: Robustness checks
types. To adapt the model to the vertical pillar structure of the German banking
system, for instance, one replaces the row- and column-regular blocks in (2) by row-
and column-functional blocks.20 To generalize the model to three tiers, one would
extend the model to 9 blocks to include a semi-periphery. Doing so for the German
system would help distinguish regional intermediaries from the (few) genuine core
banks intermediating across the entire country.21
20A row-functional block (Doreian et al. (2005)) in our context implies that every bank in the
periphery relates to a single bank in the core.
21One indication suggestive of a three-tier system is the simple experiment of ﬁtting the model
once more on the subnetwork among core banks. This delivers an "inner core" of 28 banks with an
error of 221 (17% of links).
25ﬁcance
The core-periphery structure appears robust and stable over time, but is the ﬁt su!-
ciently tight to conclude that the interbank market is genuinely tiered? The screening
test described in Section 1.3.4 is easily passed: h(FW)=0 =122 falls well below unity.
That small a distance between the network and the model demonstrates that the
tiered structure is a superior benchmark than the alternative, which comprised only
ap e r i p h e r y .
In the second step, we test this score against the error distributions from ﬁtting
random networks. We generated 1000 Erdös-Rényi random graphs and 1000 scale-
free networks of the same dimension and density as the German interbank network
(q = 1802;g =0 =61%). We then ﬁtted P to each realization, and traced out the
distributions Ih against which to assess the error score of the German network. Figure
6 shows the histograms of the normalized error scores (4) for each class of random
networks separately.22
The error score distributions show that both classes of random networks exhibit
tight statistical properties.23 The Erdös-Rényi random graphs show error scores
highly concentrated around 0.983. This is so close to unity that there is really no
value in identifying a core in random networks. Importantly, even the best-ﬁtting
realization of 1000 networks produced an error score of 0.981, more than 8 times that
of the German interbank network. The scale-free networks come much closer.24 This
was to be expected, since scale-free networks are known to produce hubs that char-
acterize many real networks, including interbank markets (Boss et al. (2004)). Even
so, none of the 1000 realizations of scale-free networks produced an error score of less
than 0.204, a distance that remains by a factor of 1.8 larger than that of the German
network.The goodness of ﬁt for the German interbank network thus lies outside any
conceivable percentile of the error distribution for both classes of random networks.
We can therefore reject the hypothesis that random networks produce the extent of
tiering evidenced by the German banking system. Put dierently, the core-periphery
22See Appendix B on the robustness checks we used to ascertain that the test distributions reﬂect
the intrinsic randomness of networks, rather than stochastic output from an unreliable procedure.
23Scale-free networks consistently produced cores of size 55-57. Random graphs featured cores of
size 17 or 18, in 86% and 14% of cases, respectively.
24Interestingly, the Monte Carlo experiments produced binning into four distinct error score classes
(red in Figure 6). We made considerable eorts to ensure that these were not local minima, especially
for the clusters around higher error scores (see Appendix B). More work is needed to uncover the
reasons behind this phenomenon.
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3.2.2 SigniThis figure compares the total error score from fitting the tiering model to the German 
interbank network (12.2% of links, shown as an arrow) to the normalized error scores, 
as defined as in equation (4), from fitting two types of random networks of the same 
dimension. The red bars show the histogram of error scores from fitting 1000 scale-free 
networks, whereas the blue bars represent the histrogram from fitting 1000 Erdös-Rényi 
random graphs.  
Figure 6: German Fit against simulated Error Score Densities
model is a much better description of the German interbank network than of ran-
dom networks. We conclude that the tiering observed among German banks does
not result from standard random processes. Indeed, the statistical approach to net-
work formation is ill-suited for social and economic networks, which are the result of
purposeful activity by agents weighing the costs and beneﬁts of forming links (Goyal
(2007) and Jackson (2008)). One should therefore expect dierent kinds of banks to
build systematically dierent patterns of linkages — a direction we explore next.
27The concept of tiering captures a structural quality of the interbank market that
allocates banks into a core and a periphery. As is characteristic for network analysis,
this allocation is derived from the pattern of linkages alone: network statistics are
calculated disregarding any other information on individual nodes. But one would
expect that a bank’s network position would be related to bank-speciﬁc features, such
as its size, location, business model, or funding sources. We regard this unexplored
link as a promising bridge between banking theory and network analysis, essential for
a better understanding of the formation of interbank networks.
In this section, we explore whether individual bank features help explain how banks
position themselves in the interbank market. In particular, what kind of banks make
up the core of the network? To test whether a bank’s membership in the core can
be predicted by bank-speciﬁc features, we assembled balance sheet variables for the
1802 active banks in the German interbank network in the mid-sample quarter 2003
Q2, using the monthly banking data collected by the Bundesbank’s statistics depart-
ment (monatliche Bilanzstatistik).25 These variables serve as regressors in a probit
regression, where the binary dependent variable is core membership: el =1if bank l




The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the simplest regression using bank size as the sole
explanatory variable. The log of total bank assets is highly signiﬁcant; a marginal
increase in size from the average balance sheet of 230 million raises the probability of
belonging to the core by a sixth of a percent. Indeed, size is a fairly reliable classiﬁer.
The average size of banks in the core is 51 times that of banks in the periphery. Hence,
large banks tend to be in the core, while small banks are found in the periphery of
the interbank network.
This intuitive result is in line with earlier studies on interbank markets. For
instance, Cocco et al. (2009) ﬁnd that small interbank borrowers rely more on re-
lationships, preferably with larger banks. Interbank markets typically have natural
25This test is in the spirit of the industrial organization approach to banking (surveyed in Degryse
et al. (2009)), but focuses on overall market structure rather than on individual bank performance.
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4 Interbank tiering and money center banks
4.1 What makes a core bank?lenders and borrowers (Stigum and Crescenzi (2007)); in the federal funds market,
small banks tend to turn over surplus funds to large banks that distribute or invest
the funds (Ho and Saunders (1985), Allen and Saunders (1986), Bech and Atalay
(2010)). Further back in US monetary history, small rural banks cleared at money
centers that, in turn, were dealing with each other and with the large New York
banks, a process known as reserve pyramiding (White (1983)). These observations
are all consistent with our view that interbank markets have a tiered structure.
Is the importance of bank size for network position an expression of economies of
scale and scope? This question should be addressed with a deﬁnition of size that is
unrelated to a bank’s interbank activity. The intermediary function that core banks
perform, by borrowing and lending in the interbank market, of course contributes to
their reported balance sheet size. We thus compute the intrinsic size of a bank as
(the logarithm of) total assets excluding interbank lending. This measure captures
all positions relating to the bank’s other business lines, including that of a!liated
entities consolidated into its balance sheet. Intrinsic size, when used alone, delivers a
p o o rﬁ ta n dt h ec o e !cient — although signiﬁcant — is too small to identify core banks
at the default threshold (column 1b). The variable remains signiﬁcant but adds little
explanatory power when used jointly with others (not reported). Economies of scale
a n ds c o p ep e rs es e e mt op l a yal i m i t e dr o l ei ne x p l a i n i n gab a n k ’ sp o s i t i o ni nt h e
interbank market. This may reﬂect a degree of specialization among banks: some very
large universal banks focus their other business to a greater extent on capital markets
and on international activity, which lies beyond the observed (domestic) network.
T h es i n g l em o s te ective regressor will be one that takes network data into ac-
count. Column 2a shows that a bank’s connectedness predicts quite reliably whether
or not it is in the core, where we measure connectedness by betweenness centrality,a
concept borrowed from sociology (Freeman (1979)). Betweenness is the probability
with which a node lies on the shortest path between any two unconnected nodes.
The probit regression makes clear that connectedness predicts core membership bet-
ter than does bank size. This is not surprising when one recognizes tiering as a
"group version" of betweenness: the core comprises the banks that jointly interme-
diate between the periphery, so a bank that helps to link pairs of unconnected banks
also contributes to the core performing this role for the market as a whole. More
intriguing is the presence of outliers: for reasons of specialization, some very large
banks were found to be far less connected than their size and presence in the core
29would suggest. This touches on the open question of whether "too-big-to-fail" or
"too-connected-to-fail" is the relevant criterion for ﬁnancial stability.
To examine this link directly, we estimate each bank’s systemic importance using
the approach taken in the interbank contagion literature. Systemic importance is
measured by the damage a bank’s failure inﬂicts upon the rest of the system (e.g.
Upper and Worms (2004)). Such simulations often require a loss-given-default (LGD)
which is generally unknown. Craig, Fecht, and von Borstel (2010) proceed to solve
for the LGD that would be required for a bank’s failure to cause a systemic crisis
(deﬁned as 25% of system assets in default). The variable systemic importance used
in regression 2b is the inverse of this value, because more important banks bring
down the system already at smaller LGDs. Systemic importance is highly correlated
with a bank’s network position: it is extremely unlikely that a systemically important
bank would not be in the core, as indicated by the low rate of false core predictions,
Prob(c|P). But the moderate ﬁt also suggests that a bank’s position in the network
is something that goes beyond its systemic importance.
In practice, a major problem for central banks and regulators is that the bilateral
interbank exposures for conducting network analysis and assessing systemic risk are
unavailable in most countries. Is it possible to identify the core of the interbank
market with a regression that uses only individual balance sheet variables? Columns
3 (and 1) present probit regressions excluding those regressors for which network
d a t aa r er e q u i r e d( t h o s es h a d e di nT a b l e1 ) . Interbank liabilities help predict core
membership quite well, although total bank size performed a little better, in part
due to economies of scale and scope (column 3a). However, the prediction can be
further improved by focusing on the size of interbank intermediation activity. The
variable intermediation measures the volume each bank intermediates, by taking the
minimum between its borrowing and lending in the interbank market. (It would be
zero for banks that only borrow or lend, regardless of the volume.) Column 3b shows
that this variable predicts core membership nearly as reliably as connectedness, and
better than systemic importance, without requiring the bilateral data necessary for
these two regressors.
Finally, we include the aforementioned variables jointly to examine their respective
explanatory power. In regression 4a, it is clear that each regressor remains signiﬁcant
in concert with the others: bank size, betweenness, and systemic importance all
contribute signiﬁcantly to explaining which banks form the core. Each variable adds
30a facet to core membership that is related to — but distinct from — the other two.
The ﬁnal regression, 4b, indicates that the explanatory power of systemic importance
falls (to 8% signiﬁcance) when interbank intermediation and betweenness are included
together, suggesting that a bank’s interbank position and the volume it intermediates
in the interbank market jointly contain most of the information embodied in systemic
importance.
All in all, the results of Table 1 show that network position is predictable by
bank-speciﬁc features. Banks are in the core because they are well-connected, both
when measured by connectedness (betweenness centrality) and in terms of contagion
(systemic importance); they are also in the core due to their ability to carry out large
transactions, as measured by their balance sheet size or by the volume of interbank
intermediation they perform. None of these concepts by itself fully explains core
membership, but each adds to the qualities that make up a core bank.
A bank in the core of a tiered interbank market can therefore be regarded as a
money center bank. This term is generally associated with large banks that dominate
wholesale activity in money markets; in addition to running traditional banking op-
erations, money center banks provide clearing and correspondent banking services,
and act as dealers in a broad range of markets, including government securities, FX,
derivatives, and oshore markets (Stigum and Crescenzi (2007)). As money mar-
ket makers, they do interdealer business among themselves, inside the spread they
quote to other, more peripheral banks. As such, money center banks are those in-
termediaries occupying the special network position we identify as the core. In this
network sense, money center banks play a central role among banks, in dealing among
themselves and tying in the periphery.
.2 Concluding remarks: bridging two literatures
In relating network position to bank-speciﬁc features, our paper bridges two litera-
tures. The banking literature, elegantly summarized by Freixas and Rochet (2008),
examines individual bank incentives with no concern for how banks position them-
selves in a larger network. The literature on network formation, on the other hand,
often relies on random processes from statistical mechanics (e.g. Newman et al.
(2006)). Even recent game-theoretic models of strategic network formation (Goyal
(2007) and Jackson (2008) provide excellent surveys) disregard the features of indi-
vidual nodes. In our view, this severely limits what such models can predict in the
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4way of network formation. For instance, in some network formation games the pure
star emerges as the unique equilibrium architecture (Bala and Goyal (2000), Goyal
and Vega-Redondo (2007), Hojman and Szeidl (2008)); but since these theories can-
not predict which node will form the center of the network, they must be regarded,
in a sense, as indeterminate.
Our ﬁndings suggests that bank-speciﬁc features help explain how banks position
themselves in the interbank market, as evidenced by the regression results. Balance
sheet variables also help predict interbank relations in other studies (Cocco et al.
(2009)), with implications for overall market structure. As tiering is not random but
behavioral, there are economic reasons why the banking system organizes itself around
a core of money center banks. The strong correlation with size suggests the presence
of ﬁxed costs, possibly with economies of scale and scope. To better understand
ﬁnancial networks, we argue that the way forward should focus more on the features
of the nodes that make up the network. In the context of banking, this provides clues
for theoretical modeling eorts as to how dierent banks choose to make network
connections.
A class of recent banking models does take into account the fact that interbank
markets operate as networks rather than centralized exchanges. Allen and Gale (2000)
propose a framework in which banks of dierent regions (or sectors) face opposite liq-
uidity shocks. This provides an incentive for banks to insure each other ex ante, which
can be done through interbank deposits. In a related model, Leitner (2005) demon-
strates that interbank deposits help induce banks to bail each other out. Similarly,
Babus (2009) shows that it is optimal for banks to exchange deposits with all banks
facing opposite liquidity shocks.26 However, this approach predicts dense networks,
contrary to the core-periphery structure we detected for the German interbank net-
work. That core-periphery structure is also highly persistent, which clashes with the
view that random liquidity shocks are the basis for understanding interbank activity.
Moreover, the interbank market in these models is essentially ﬂat — there is no role
for intermediation. Banks are identical ex ante, including in the way they connect to
each other. There is no reason in these models why banks, the main intermediaries
in the economy, would build yet another layer of intermediation between them.
To explain the tiered structures we explored in this paper, a model would require
26It is unclear whether this theory predicts a network of interbank deposits. Other instruments
are available for implementing risk-sharing, including insurance contracts, derivatives, and credit
lines.
32some asymmetry or specialization. Two existing models do so by assumption. In the
two-tier bank model of Qi (2008), the "correspondent" bank is assumed to be dierent:
its ability to borrow costlessly makes other banks use it as a liquidity pool, much like
a central bank. However, the central bank is not the only interbank intermediary, as
is apparent from the German interbank network. Freixas et al. (2000) provide an
example of such a case, obtained by assuming that all travelers pass through a single
location.27 The bank located there receives and extends lines vis-à-vis banks in all
other locations (which are not connected to each other). Though both settings are
constructed rather than derived, they lead to pure star networks with a single money
center bank at the core. The core-periphery network is a generalization of the star
network with several interconnected centers. To better understand the formation of
such networks, it would therefore seem promising to start out from a model featuring
a variety of diverse banking ﬁrms.
27Consumers of dierent regions face uncertainty about where to consume. Interbank credit lines




Part a) To show that the presence of intermediaries is necessary, consider a network
Q of dimension q in which the are no intermediaries in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.
Banks are either lenders ( in number), or borrowers ( in number), or neither of the
two (q  0). We ﬁrst show that the latter group, the unattached banks, must
be in the periphery, because each unattached bank causes fewer errors in (3) relative
to the model (2) when allocated to the periphery. To see this, suppose there is an
unattached bank among the f banks in the core. This causes exactly 2(f  1) errors
in the FF block, and (q  f) errors in each of the blocks FS and SF of (3). The
same bank placed in the periphery would cause no errors in FF (nor in SS), but
could add up to 2(f1) errors for expanding the FS and SF blocks (if all remaining
core banks are not linked to the periphery). Switching the unattached bank from
core to periphery thus leads to a net reduction in the total number of errors of at
least 2(q  f), which is always positive (and zero if the periphery is empty). The
move thus weakly dominates for the ﬁrst unattached, and strictly dominates for each
subsequent unattached bank and every combination of unattached banks. Therefore,
it is optimal to allocate all unattached banks to the periphery.
We proceed to show that the same argument holds for the remaining core banks,
which must be either lenders or borrowers (not both). Suppose that F lenders and
F borrowers are in the core (so that F + F = f,w i t h0  F  , 0  F  ).
Without loss of generality, reorder the nodes in each tier such that the lenders appear
ﬁrst, followed by the borrowers and the unattached. This divides each of the four
blocks as shown in (8). The absence of intermediaries implies many zero blocks, since
lenders borrow from noone, borrowers lend to noone, and the remaining banks are












Now, the number of errors of this (arbitrary) allocation can be reduced as long as there
a r eb a n k sl e f ti nt h ec o r e .A p p l y i n g( 3 )t o( 8 )s h o w st h a tt h eFF block generates at
34least F (F  1) + F (F  1) + FF errors, the number of zero entries in the top
left block, and more if the sub-block FF is not complete with ones. The FS block
(top right) comprises at least F(q  F  F) errors, where the term in brackets is
the dimension of the periphery (of which S    F are borrowers). Likewise, the
SF block counts at least F(qF F) errors, and more if the sub-block SF is
not column-regular as required by (2). This allocation thus produces, for these three
blocks, at least
(q  1)(F + F)+FF (9)
errors, plus the number of nonzeros in the sub-block SS,d e n o t e db y#(SS).I f
all banks were placed in the periphery instead, the errors would equal the number of
nonzeros, which cannot exceed = Expanding  (using   F + S) shows that
(9) exceeds #() provided
F [(q  1)  S]+F [(q  1)  S] A 0= (10)
The terms in square brackets are always positive when there is one or more unattached
banks in the network (implying (q  1) A+ ); in that case, the error score can
always be reduced by placing all banks in the periphery, i.e. until F = F =0 .I f
there are no unattached banks, the same conclusion holds for all but one peculiar
network for which the net gain in (10) would be zero.28 Since moving all banks to the
periphery is strictly dominant for all networks (and weakly dominant for one peculiar
network), the absence of intermediaries implies an empty core.
To show su!ciency, i.e. that a network containing intermediaries gives rise to
a non-empty core, assume to the contrary that the core is empty and at least one
bank, say bank l, intermediates. Since all banks are in the periphery, the presence
of l contributes at least two errors to SS. Allowing bank l to form a core by itself
removes both errors without producing any new errors in the three new blocks of (3).
By the same argument, adding more intermediaries to Q can expand, but cannot
reduce, the size of the core. Thus the presence of intermediaries produces a core.
What remains to be checked is that the periphery does not vanish. The core is
potentially largest when all banks lend to each other: placing q  1 banks in the
core will minimize the error score to zero. The same score can be also attained by
28If a single bank lends to all other banks in the system (S = q1,a n dF =0 ), then the total
error score is unaected by whether that lender is in the core or the periphery. (The same holds for
the single-borrower case, where S = q  1,a n dF =0 .)
35moving all q banks to the core, which would leave no periphery. However, one missing
bilateral link is su!cient (not necessary) to guarantee that a periphery always exists.
Suppose banks l and m are not connected to each other (Qlm = Qml =0 ). The two
zeros contribute two errors in FF if both banks remain in the core. Moving l or m
jointly to the periphery yields a net gain: the two zeros are now in the SS block
where they do not count as errors, and the FS and SF blocks that this move created
cannot contain more errors than they did as part of the FF block.29A single missing
link is therefore su!cient to sustain a periphery even when all other banks lend to
each other.
Part b) The proof that all core banks are intermediaries is by contradiction.
Suppose a bank that does not intermediate is in the core. We show that the distance-
minimizing procedure will place this bank in the periphery. A bank that does not
intermediate has no outgoing interbank links, or no incoming links, or no links at
all. We need to consider only one case, that of zero out—degree.30 First compute how
many errors this bank, say l, causes as a member of the core. The core consists of
f banks including l, and we use (3) to aggregate errors in the four blocks delineated
by the single lines in the matrix below. Links with core banks never cause errors, so
we can focus on the missing links. By not lending at all, bank l contributes at least
(f  1) errors to FF,p l u s(q  f) errors to FS for violating row-regularity in that
block. This contribution to the error score, q1,i saminimum value: it is higher if







Moving bank l to the periphery will permit a net reduction in the number of errors.
This move changes the four blocks as indicated by the double lines in the matrix. The
29If each core bank is connected to at least one bank among l and m,t h en e wFS and SF blocks
will contain no errors at all. If some core banks are attached to neither l nor m, then the corresponding
rows in FS (columns in SF) will contain as many errors as was the case when these rows (columns)
were part of the FF block. This continues to hold even if all core banks are unconnected to this
pair of banks (then l and m are unattached and best put in the periphery, as shown above). Moving
l and m to the periphery saves at least two errors in each case.
30The case of zero in—degree is symmetric. That unattached banks go to the periphery was shown
in part a).
36FF block shrinks, transferring its column l to FS and row l to SF, respectively; and
SS expands, taking column l from SF and row l from FS, respectively. The ﬁrst
transfer removes all the errors that l h a dc a u s e di nFF and may add new errors to
FS and SF that are strictly fewer in number than those saved FF.( T h e r ei s o n e
possible exception where the net gain reaches zero. This occurs only if none of the
remaining core banks borrow from any periphery banks (f1 errors), and either some
core banks do not lend to the periphery or bank l borrows from all core banks.) The
second transfer also delivers a net improvement: the (q  f) errors formerly in FS no
longer count as errors when moved to SS, but column l now in SS may add errors
if it contains ones; the net reduction in errors is again strictly positive, except in the
one case where bank l happens to borrow from all (q  f) banks in the periphery.
Combining these error reductions shows that the distance-minimizing procedure
will move bank l to the periphery, contradicting the initial claim that a noninterme-
diary can be in the core. (The one exception for which there is weak dominance can
occur only if l borrows from all banks, or some other core banks do not intermediate
between periphery banks, a case considered in what follows.) Thus all core banks are
intermediaries.
The converse, that all intermediaries are also core banks, does not hold. Suppose
bank l is in the core but intermediates only among core banks. It is straightforward
to show, with the approach just used, that moving l to the periphery always produces
a net reduction of at least 2(q  f) errors (which had been in FS and SF but no
longer count as errors when part of SS). Hence, not every intermediary is a core
bank.
W eg e n e r a l i z et h i sc a s eb ys h o w i n gt h a tac o r eb a n kt h a td o e sn o tl e n dt o( or
does not borrow from) the periphery will not be in the core. Suppose bank l does not
lend to any bank in the periphery. Its presence in the core contributes (q  f) errors
to FS and {  0 errors to FF for any missing links with other core banks. Moving
bank l to the periphery again leads to a net reduction in errors. The argument follows
exactly the one just advanced for nonintermediaries, the only dierence being that
the number of errors involved in the ﬁrst transfer, now {, need not exceed (f  1).
The result carries through that moving l to the periphery is strictly dominant, again
with one exception where it is weakly dominant. The analogous case of a bank that
does not borrow from the periphery can be shown by symmetry. Therefore, the core
excludes intermediaries that do not lend to (or do not borrow from) the periphery.
37Appendix B: Computational methods
As stated, ﬁtting a core-periphery model to a real-world network is a large-scale prob-
lem in combinatorial optimization, which we solve by means of a sequential algorithm.
This way, the search for the optimal core leads to a solution in polynomial time, rather
than in exponential time (2q) required by exhaustive search. Section 1.3.3 described
two versions of the algorithm that we designed for this task, both running in poly-
nomial time (order q1).31 In our application to the German network (q =1 8 0 2 ), the
algorithm converged in 70 seconds on a standard IntelCore 2 duo processor (2.4GHz).
For NP-hard problems of this dimension, it is not possible to prove that the solu-
tion returned by any procedure is indeed the global optimum. We therefore performed
several robustness checks to dispel doubts. First, we backtested our algorithm against
existing blockmodeling routines, and obtained the same solutions for small example
networks.32 We also tested that the algorithm ﬁnds the optimum for cases where
the true solution is known: we generated artiﬁcial networks (of the same dimension
and density as the German system) with a perfectly tiered structure, for which the
minimum error score (4) must be zero, by construction. The algorithm consistently
returned the correct set of core banks with zero errors. Second, we know from Propo-
sition 1 that any solution returning nonzero elements on the o-diagonal of the error
matrix H cannot be an optimum — in practice, the procedure never returned solu-
tions failing this criterion. However, as this is a necessary (not a su!cient) condition,
one cannot rely on this test alone to rule out all local optima. Our third and main
robustness check therefore consisted of repeated application and careful comparison
of the results generated by two algorithms (see section 1.3.3).
This was straightforward to do for the single application to the German inter-
bank network, and reliably yielded the solution reported in the text. To prepare
the thousands of runs necessary for hypothesis testing, we compared the error scores
calculated with simulated annealing programs with various "cooling" parameters and
many dierent initial partitions, with the greedy algorithms using dierent initial
conditions. For avoiding local optima it turned out to be helpful to start the greedy
algorithm su!ciently far from an approximate solution to give it time to converge to
the error-minimizing core. The best simulated annealing algorithms gave error scores
31The MATLAB code is available upon request from the authors.
32The software Pajek (Batagelj et al. (2003)) implements generalized blockmodeling for networks
of up to 256 nodes.
38very close to a greedy algorithm with initial partitions that assigned a random half
of the banks to the core. The local optima that did occur were easily identiﬁed by
their extremely high error score, which would fall to the normal range when ﬁtting
the same network again.
The distributions shown in Figure 6, using the greedy algorithm with random
initial partitions, oered consistently the minimum error score, always close to the
best solution of any of the algorithms we tried. We performed robustness checks on the
algorithm to make sure that the initial conditions and parameters were consistent with
generating the minimum error scores for both types of random networks (see Appendix
B). The core sizes did not vary between the algorithms, although the error scores did
ﬂuctuate in a narrow range for dierent initial conditions. Taken together, these
robustness tests assured us that the distributions generated for the hypothesis tests
reﬂect the intrinsic randomness of random networks, rather than stochastic output
from an unreliable procedure. The random networks were generated in Matlab, using
the routine of Muchnik et al. (2007) for obtaining directed scale-free networks.
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43Table 1:  Core membership and bank-specific variables 
The table reports the results of probit regressions testing whether network position can be 
predicted by individual bank balance sheet variables. The binary variable core membership
takes the value 1 for banks that were determined to be in the core, and 0 for the remaining 
banks. It is regressed on a constant and the regressors shown in the rows, which rely only on 
individual bank data (except for the shaded variables, which require the network data). The 
columns show the different regressions, each comprising 1802 observations. The cells show the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients. The marginal effects are shown in 
parentheses, evaluated at the multivariate point of means. Significance is denoted by *(5%) and 
**(1%). 
Bank size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in ȯ thousands plus 1); Intrinsic size excludes
interbank claims from total assets before taking the logarithm. Interbank liabilities is the logarithm of
(interbank liabilities+1). The fit with interbank liabilities was slightly better than that with interbank
assets (not reported). Intermediation is the logarithm of interbank liabilities that a bank in turn lends
out on the interbank market, i.e. Ln  (min { interbank assets, interbankl iabilities } +1). Connectedness
is normalized betweenness centrality (Freeman (1979)). Systemic importance of an institution is 
measured here as the (inverse) loss-given-default necessary such that the failure of the institution 
leads to a systemic crisis (a quarter of the banking system in default). The probabilities in the final 
rows are evaluated at the default threshold of 0.5. Prob(c|C) = probability (in %) that a bank 
predicted to be in the core is indeed in the core (=100-Prob(p|C)). Prob(c|P) =  rate of false core 
predictions.
Regressors  1a  1b  2a  2b  3a  3b  4a  4b 
Bank size  0.903** 
(0.0014) 
      0.361** 
(0.0821) 
Intrinsic size  0.149**  
(0.0073)        
Interbank liabilities       0.667** 
(0.0006)     

















2 0.573 0.073 0.654 0.475 0.542 0.579 0.736 0.765 
% correctly classified  98.5% 97.5% 98.8% 98.5% 98.0% 98.7% 99.0% 99.1% 
Prob(c |C) core correct 48.9%  0%  60.0% 42.2% 42.2% 51.1% 68.9% 71.1% 
Prob(c |P) core false  0.17%  0%  0.17% 0.06% 0.57% 0.06% 0.17% 0.23% 
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